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How should we react to the challenge of religious fundamentalism without betraying our own 
liberal values? The Neopragmatist Richard Rorty presents a convincing answer to this 
pressing question. His ironic-pragmatic liberalism is an alternative to (christian) 
refundamentalization and postmodern relativism as he combines irony in matters of 
justification with loyalty to our values. This short article claims the usefulness of continuing 
the conversation with Rorty’s Neopragmatism for political theory and practice. One could call 
this project “Rorty 2.0”. 
 
American Pragmatism has had a renaissance in the past decades. But the transformative 
thinking of Richard Rorty is still underestimated in political theory. His neopragmatism can 
be reconstructed as a fragile, but consistent combination of private romanticism and public 
pragmatism. It is best characterized by the idea of a pragmatic coexistence of these two main 
dimensions of Rorty’s thinking. Romanticism of linguistic creativity and prosaic liberalism 
are reconciled by use of the private-public distinction. The reconstruction reveals that this 
coexistence-strategy is all in all consistent but there are some corrections required. The most 
important of these relate to questions of borderline between his romantic and his pragmatic 
impulse.1 The required modification of Rorty’s use of the private-public distinction itself is 
possible in a Rortyan spirit. One could call this project “Rorty 2.0“. 
This project follows John Dewey’s maxim, “Pragmatism must take its own medicine.” The 
pragmatic method has to be applied to Rorty’s thinking itself: What are the “fruits” of his 
anti-fundamentalist utopia of a society of ironic-pragmatic liberals for political theory and for 
the liberal practice? Following selected topics are then getting in the focus: 1. Would it be 
helpful for intercultural dialogue if we adopt the ironic-pragmatic attitude regarding 
justification which Rorty recommends? Wouldn’t Rortyan Liberals be condemned to a self-
refuting relativism? How could we argue for our human rights culture without the appeal to 
Truth? 2. Could we still criticize our own liberal culture without this appeal? Is Rorty’s own 
theory and praxis of criticism convincing? 3. Does the “ethnocentric” notion of a political 
justification-community really make sense in our pluralistic societies? Or isn’t it rather naïve 
                                                          
1 See: Müller, M. (2014): Private Romantik, öffentlicher Pragmatismus. Richard Rortys transformative 
Neubeschreibung des Liberalismus, Bielefeld: transcript, (part 3). 
  
and dangerous, because it’s neglection of power-structures and its tendency to premature 
exclusion. 
Most promising is the individual level of Rorty’s ironic liberalism, i.e. his ideal of citizenship: 
the liberal ironist. She “embodies” not only his coexistence-conception of private romanticism 
and public pragmatism but also an indirect, because pragmatic answer to the theoretical 
failing and the political dangerousness of (philosophical) foundationalism. The normative 
question “Why be moral?” is transformed in a question of practical identity. 
Ironism is Rorty’s notion for an offensive antifoundationalism which should be understood as 
a crucial step towards a serene moral fallibilism without nostalgia. The irony of the liberal 
ironist stands for an enlightened awareness of the contingency of the liberal vocabulary which 
is central to her public identity. It is a reaction to the crisis of the project of grounding 
political values. Until today philosophy has not succeeded in supplying an uncontroversial 
justification of our liberal culture. Its promise to deliver a grounding of morality independent 
of religious traditions remains still unfulfilled. But according to Rorty this justification-project 
is not only condemned to failure but also harmful to democracy. Any claim of truth leads to 
dangerous and infinitive arguing in the public discourse. It presents a danger for freedom and 
tolerance, the basic values of a pluralistic society. 
Rorty’s ironic-pragmatic liberalism combines this antifoundationalism with a 
communitarianism of justification. Although Rorty is definitely a liberal political thinker on 
the contentual level, he turns out to be a communitarian on the justification level. He himself 
calls this position, in the usual provocative manner: ethnocentrism. And his figure of the 
liberal ironist is both at the same time: ironist and liberal ethnocentrist. Her contextual 
identity is characterized by a liberal enclosure of her irony. Irony does not lead to solidarity 
according to Rorty, like some of his critics are assuming. It is rather privatized in the context 
of a practical balance between irony and solidarity. And this privatization is only 
pragmatically justified with reference to the already existing art of separation in liberal 
societies. The liberal ironist respects the (fuzzy!) border between private and public realm and 
the prohibition of cruelty because she is a loyal member of her political identification-
community. The aim of her political commitment is the global enforcement of the liberal 
values as best answer yet to the challenge of pluralism. These values are not understood as 
objective truths but as the historically proven moral tools of the contextual tradition with 
which she identifies herself. As a liberal she is committed to these values and prepared to 
defend them if necessary. But due to her fallibilist attitude she avoids the understandable 
temptation of refundamentalization in the contention with fundamentalist positions. 
  
Rorty outlines with his ironic-pragmatic liberalism not only an important contribution to 
political theory but also a possible way for us citizens of contemporary liberal societies how 
we can stick to our political values and commit ourselves to them while at the same time 
being aware that these values lack a philosophical grounding. His vision of a pragmatic 
balance of private search for self-creation and public solidarity can be considered as a “live 
option” (James). The figure of the liberal ironist is – with some corrections – a useful 
personification of a pragmatic fallibilism which we should champion even in the face of 
fundamentalism. It is a convincing ideal of democratic citizenship, especially in our times of 
terror. 
